I investigate the different roles played by two components of trading volume, informed-trading and liquidity-trading, in the volatility-volume relation at the aggregate level. Using transaction data and an extended trading model of Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman (1996), I estimate a marketwide private information arrival rate (P IAR) variable and use it to control for the informed trading component in trading volume. Contrary to the belief that aggregate trading volume mainly represents liquidity trading, my results show that the marketwide-private-information-trading component in aggregate trading volume is the underlying driving force for the positive volatility-volume relation.
Introduction
It is a well established observation that stock volatility and trading volume are positively correlated. For example, Karpoff (1987) surveys the early work on this relation; Schwert (1989) documents that the growth rate of trading volume relates to stock volatility at the aggregate level; Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) insert volume in the GARCH variance process and find it to be strongly significant, while past return shocks become insignificant.
Despite many empirical studies on the volatility-volume relation, there is no general consensus about what is the underlying driving force for this relation. Note that, volume has two components, liquidity-trading and informed-trading components (He and Wang (1995) , Llorente, Michaely, Saar and Wang (2001) Kaul and Lipson (1994) find that the number of trades appears to provide virtually all the explanation for the volatility-volume relation, with the average trade size playing a trivial role; while Chan and Fong (2000) reconfirm the significance of the size of trades. However, the currently used decomposition in the literature may not be able to capture the underlying economic nature of informed and liquidity trading. In fact the microstructure literature shows that both the number of trades and the varying size of trades have some information content, though not to the same extent (Barclay and Warner (1993) , Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1997) ).
In this paper, I use a new approach to investigate the different roles played by informed and liquidity trading in the volatility-volume relation at the aggregate level.
Instead of decomposing trading volume directly, I create a micro-data measured marketwide private information variable and use it as a control for the informed-trading component of trading volume.
I extend the trading model as the one in Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman 1 (1996) by adding a marketwide information component. Then using transaction data, I estimate a marketwide information arrival rate (P IAR hereafter) variable. The hypothesis is that if the liquidity trading component is the driving force in the volatilityvolume relation, controlling for P IAR should not have a significant impact on this relation. The alternative is that adding P IAR will dominate the role of trading volume. I test this hypothesis using two approaches. First, I insert both volume and P IAR into the GARCH variance process. The result shows that P IAR is strongly significant, while volume loses its explanatory power. Second, I run an OLS regression of daily stock market volatility on volume and P IAR. Controlling for P IAR, volume has only a small (if any) incremental explanatory power. The results are consistent with the argument that the information-trading component is the underlying driving force behind the volatility-volume relation.
The main contributions of this study are threefold. First, I construct a marketwide private information arrival rate (P IAR) variable, which may provide more direct tests for other models related to marketwide private information (for example, Chan (1993) 1 ). In the existing literature, most of the private information measures are at the firm-level (Hasbrouck (1991 (Hasbrouck ( , 1993 , Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman(1996) ). P IAR, instead, measures the marketwide common private information.
In addition, the time-varying properties of P IAR are also very interesting. Recent papers by Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam (1999 , 2000 and Fernando (2002) study the commonality in liquidity. This study adds to this branch by investigating the commonality of private information.
Second, this study also contributes to the stock market volatility literature. In order to test the private information hypothesis of volatility, previous studies compare volatility across trading and non-trading days (French and Roll (1986) , Barclay, Litzenberger and Warner (1990) ) or regress volatility on information announcements (Michell and Mulherin (1994) , Berry and Howe (1994) , Melvin and Yin (2000) 2 ). Us- Some authors (Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993) ) argue that aggregate trading volume represents "liquidity" trading only. However, the results in this paper show that the marketwide private information trading component plays a very important role.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and empirical methodology used to estimate P IAR. Section 3 describes the date set and sample selection criteria. Empirical results are in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
Marketwide Private Information Arrival Rate (PIAR)
I measure the marketwide private information arrival rate using a sequential trade model similar to the one in Easley, Kvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002) . The only difference is that I consider N stocks which have a common marketwide information component.
The trading process is captured in Figure 1 and 2.
Assume N stocks are traded in the market. Each day, there is P w probability that a marketwide information comes and P si probability that firm-specific information component comes for firm i, where P w and P si are independently drawn from some stable density function f (µ w ) and f (µ s ), with mean µ w and µ s , respectively. Condipublic information arrival flow.
3 tioning on the occurrence of an information event, bad news happens with probability δ; good news with probability 1 − δ. Conditioning on the occurrence of firm-specific news, this news is a bigger one comparing to marketwide information with probability L i , smaller one with probability 1 − L i 3 . The informed traders come according to a
Poisson distribution, with arrival rate µ, which is independent of P w , P si , δ and L i .
When they come, they will trade only if they receive some information signal, which happens if some information events occur. If a bad marketwide news and a big good firm-specific news come at the same time, the informed will receive a good signal; while a bad marketwide news and a small good firm-specific news will end up with a bad signal, so on and so forth 4 . The informed will buy if he/she receives a good signal, sell if a bad one, not trade otherwise. The arrival rates of buy and sell orders from uninformed traders are ε b and ε s respectively, independent of the information event occurrence. In equilibrium, the buy and sell order arrival rates are ε b and ε s + µ if aggregately bad news arrives; ε b + µ and ε s if good news arrives; ε b and ε s if no news arrives. The market makers set bid and ask prices which makes them break even and then execute orders when they arrive. They revise their quotes to reflect their updated belief about the information structure based on order flows.
For each firm, the probability of bad news arrival is (P w +(1 − P w ) P si )δ; good news arrival (P w + (1 − P w ) P si )(1 − δ). In sum, the probability of news events occurrence is P w + (1 − P w ) P si . Weighting them across N firms gives us µ s + (1 − µ s ) P w ,which is P IAR used in this paper. Since µ s is a constant, P IAR is a monotonic increasing function of P w , the marketwide information arrival rate I am interested in. The intuition that weighting across firm ends up with only the probability of marketwide information is as follows: each day, the probability of firm-specific information arrival is high for some firms and low for some other firms, but as firm number increases, the average of these probabilities always goes to their long run mean (µ s ), which is a constant over time. As a result, the weighted average of information arrival rates varies only with the probability of marketwide information arrival rate.
This structure model can be used to work backwards to provide an estimate of P IAR. In particular, all the parameters θ = {α ≡ P w + (1 − P w )P si , δ, µ, ε b , ε s } are estimated quarterly using maximum likelihood. Posterior probability of news events occurs are calculated for each day, based on quarterly estimated parameters and daily buy and sell numbers. Finally, daily posterior probability for each firm are weighted across firms to get P IAR.
The conditional probability that we observe B buys and S sells on a bad news day of total time T is given by
Similarly, the conditional probability of observing B buys and S sells on a good news day is
Finally, on a no-event day, the likelihood is
The likelihood function of observing B buys and S sells on each day is
Setting T = 1 so that the arrival rate is a daily arrival rate, the likelihood of observing
The parameters are estimated by maximizing the above likelihood function.
To calculate the daily number of buys and sells, I use the Lee and Ready (1993) algorithm, which is the standard approach in the literature. Briefly, the algorithm classifies trades as buys or sells with reference to the prevailing quote. The prevailing quote is the current quote, or the quote in effect 5 seconds ago if the current quote is less than 5 seconds old. The trade is classified as a buy if the trading price is closer to the ask; otherwise, it is assigned as a sell. If the trading price equals the bid ask midpoint, classification depends on price movements, a tick-test. A midpoint trade will be classified as a sell if the price is lower than the previous price, a buy if higher.
If the midpoint trade price equals the previous price, the algorithm looks further back until it finds a price movement. I sum the buys and sells to get the numbers of buys and sells, B i , S i . Finally, I estimate all the parameters for all stocks once per calender quarter.
With the model parameters θ mentioned above, I calculate the posterior information event arrival probability for each day and value weight them across all the stocks available on that day. The posterior probability that a given day is associated with good news is obtained by Bayes' Rule:
where L(B, S) is from equation (1). In the same way, the posterior probabilities that a given day is associated with bad news and no news can be represented as follows:
, where P means value weighting. In the current version, I only focuses on P IAR, however, it would be interesting to investigate the asymmetrical effects of good news arrival and bad news arrival. I leave it for future research.
For comparison purposes, I also measure the following variables:
w t : value weighted absolute order imbalance, where order imbalance defined for each firm is the number of buyer-initiated trades less the number of seller-initiated trades on day t. w t = P |B t − S t | where P means value weighting and B t , S t are buyer-initiated and seller-initiated numbers of trades respectively.
wsize t : similar to w t , the order imbalance is defined as the buyer-initiated shares less the seller-initiated shares traded on day t.
wvalue t : similar to w t , the order imbalance is defined as the buyer-initiated dollars less seller-initiated dollars on day t.
wliq t : value weighted order imbalance. Without taking the absolute value for order imbalance, this variable measures the number of buyer-initiated trades for the whole market (value weighted) less the number of seller-initiated trades for the whole market. wliq t = P B t − P S t where P means value weighting.
wsizeliq t : similar to wliq t , the order imbalance is measured as shares instead of trades.
wvalueliq t : similar to wliq t , the order imbalance is measured as dollar value.
wvol t : value weighted trading volume on day t.
vol t : total trading volume on day t.
Since P IAR is estimated based on the seller-initiated number of trades and buyerinitiated number of trades; we would guess that w t may be highly correlated with P IAR t . Obviously w t is much less costly to estimate than P IAR t , which is based on a maximum likelihood estimation of θ. We would like to know the empirical correlation between these two variables so as to decide whether it is suitable to use w t as a proxy of P IAR t . wliq t , wsizeliq t , wvalueliq t are order imbalance measures used in Chordia, Roll, Subrahmanyam (2002) . They document that these order imbalance measures affect market volume, liquidity and market return. Since these variables sum up buyer-and seller-initiated trades/shares/values across stocks without taking absolute value, it is not used and cannot be used to measure information asymmetry, as noted by the authors (page 11). For example, if one piece of information is good news to one firm and bad news to another, the informed traders will buy one stock and sell the other; the information event occurs for both firms, but the sum of buyerinitiated trades less the sum of seller-initiated trades may be very close to zero. In short, wliq t , wsizeliq t , wvalueliq t are more related to liquidity or inventory than to asymmetric information. It would be interesting to see the correlation between order imbalance and P IAR.
Data and Sample Selection
This study uses all the ordinary common stocks listed on the New York Stock Ex- For all stocks satisfying the above requirements, I use the following filter to select the quote and trade data. I exclude trades posted before 9:30am and after 4:00pm.
This is to exclude after-hour trades. Barclay et. al. (2002a Barclay et. al. ( , 2002b show that after- The mean of P IAR is around 0.4 with a maximum 0.98 and a minimum 0.0013. The probability of good news arriving is around 0.26, almost double the probability of bad news arriving (0.14). This reflects the fact that returns are overwhelmingly positive 9 over the sample period. The order imbalance measures wliq, wsizeliq, wvalueliq are slightly different from those reported by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002 Value-weighted trading volume wvol is highly correlated with total trading volume vol as expected.
Panel C reports autocorrelations. P IAR is persistent for more than 5 lags, however it is the least persistent measure among the 4.
From now on, I will focus only on the trade numbers measures w and wliq. For trading volume measure, I use only total trading volume vol since it is the convention in the literature. Using wsize, wvalue, wsizeliq, wvalueliq, wvol do not change the tenor of my results. Figure 1 shows the time series of daily P IAR, which varies but relatively stable over time just like our intuition about information arrival. Figure 2 is the average (using daily observations) monthly P IAR. I investigate the January effect of P IAR in Table 6 . The turn-of-the-year effect
(also called January Effect) is listed in Schwert's (2002) "Anomalies and Market
Efficiency" survey as one of the biggest anomalies in the asset pricing area. It refers to the phenomenon that much of the abnormal return to small firms occurs during the first two weeks in January, first documented by Keim (1983) and Reinganum (1983) .
Later work by Cooper, Gulen and Vassalou (2001) document that the SMB and HML perform significantly better in January, while Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2000) all document that profits from price momentum strategies are significantly worse in January. A possible interpretation for the January effect may be that more private information hits the market in January. If many firms make their annual capital budgeting decision in January, or if many important government economy-related decisions are made in January, there will be more private information in the market in January. If this is the case and the information-based stories can be used to explained the anomalies, P IAR should have different magnitude in January from other months.
Panel A reports the summary statistic of P IAR for the first 15 days of January and for the remaining days of the year. The mean of P IAR for the first 15 days 11 of January is 0.4350, higher than the mean for other days, 0.3952. Panel B reports the results for comparison of the two sample means. α 1 is the slope coefficient for the dummy, which equals one if the date is one of the first 15 days of January, zero otherwise. For P IAR measure, α 1 is significantly greater than zero, implying that P IAR is higher in the first 15 days of January. Panel C shows similar results when the dummy represents the whole month of January instead of the first 15 days. The result provides a possible role of private information arrival rate as an explanation for January effect.
Another interesting observation to note is that wliq is marginal significant lower in the first half of January, which implies that more sell in January than buy. This evidence seems to be contradict with the most popular interpretation of January effect, "window dressing" by institution investors or "tax-based sell" by individual investors. All these theories would predict more buy in January. I hasten to add that it is too early to draw convincing conclusion since I am calculating a value weighted order imbalance. wliq puts less weight on smaller and past loser stocks, which are the ones more likely to be bought back in January in "window dressing" or "tax-based sell" story. It would be interesting to investigate the order imbalance and private information arrival rate across different stock groups (size groups or winner/loser groups). I leave this topic for further research.
Empirical Results
Preliminary results are provided in Table 3 , where I report the yearly cross-correlations between the return volatility, measured by squared return, and P IAR. The return is the NYSE stock index return. Table 3 reports a strong relation between the two series. The correlation coefficient is usually between 0.3 and 0.4. Measuring the return volatility using absolute value of return, absolute value of compounded return, or squared compound return yield similar results.
Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) insert volume in the GARCH variance process and find it to be strongly significant, while past return shocks become insignificant.
My first test is adding P IAR in the GARCH model to see its impact on volume effects.
The GARCH (1,1) model of stock return volatility models conditional variance of stock return as a function of past one period squared residual and past one period variance. The daily stock return is given below:
where r t represents the rate of return, µ t−1 is the mean. GARCH(1,1) with volume has the following specification:
I add P IAR variable into the above equation to see whether volume can explain the variance only because it proxies for information flow. The model I used is
The results are reported in The second test is an OLS regression of daily stock market volatility on volume and P IAR. Following Schwert (1989 Schwert ( , 1990 and Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994) , I
measure daily volatility using the absolute residuals of the following model:
where R t is the NYSE index return on day t, D it 's are the five day-of-week dummies.
To compare the explanatory power of trading volume and P IAR, I estimate the following regressions:
where |b ε t | is the absolute residual from (2), M t is a dummy variable that equals to 1 for Mondays and 0 otherwise to count for weekend gap, regressors are trading volume on day t (vol t ), growth rate of trading volume from day t − 1 to day t (gvol t ) and P IAR. In estimating regression (3), I exclude October 1987, the market crash month, to avoid this extreme outlier. Including it does not change my fundamental results. Table 5 shows the results from Regression (3). When trading volume is the only regressor, R 2 is only 0.11. Using growth rate of trading volume, instead of trading volume level, increases the R 2 to 0.15. P IAR as the only regressor brings R 2 up to 0.21. When volatility is conditioned on P IAR, even though vol and gvol are still statistically significant, their economic significance is questionable. The inclusion of vol or gvol besides P IAR can increase R 2 only about 0.01. Another notable aspect of the evidence is that the inclusion of P IAR decreases the coefficients of vol and gvol almost by half; while, the coefficient of P IAR does not change much with or without other regressors.
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Finally, I add an interactive term of gvol and P IAR, as follows:
β 1 becomes insignificant, while β 2 is significant. If we believe that P IAR proxies for the private information arrival rate, P IAR * gvol can be looked as the information component of trading volume. After controlling this information component, gvol loses its explanatory power.
The evidence found here is consistent with the private-information interpretation of stock return volatility. As a private information measure, P IAR is highly correlated with market volatility. Trading volume has a positive relationship with volatility because it relates to P IAR; growth rate of volume is a better proxy of P IAR than trading volume in interpreting market volatility. The informed trading component in volume instead of noisy trading component is the underlying driving force for the positive relationship between volume and stock volatility.
A concern would be whether the explanatory power of P IAR obtains for mechanical reasons. First of all, when estimating the parameter using P IAR, I do not use return at all. All I am using is the buy or sell initiated trades. Second of all, none of the other variables, like w and wliq have the same explanatory power as P IAR, even though they use the same buy-initiated and sell-initiated trades variables as P IAR does. I redo the above two tests using w and wliq in the position of P IAR. Unreported results show that neither w nor wliq is significant in any years when they are included in the GARCH process. Neither are they as important as P IAR in the OLS regression. There is no reason to believe that the way I estimate P IAR is somehow mechanically related to volatility. The paper can be extended along several directions.
1. P IAR can be used to test other marketwide private information models. For example, investigating how market return cross-autocorrelation varies with P IAR is a test for the private information hypothesis of market return cross-autocorrelation.
2. With wgood, wbad, we can study the asymmetric effects of good news arrival and bad news arrival on stock return volatility and return autocorrelation.
3. Measuring P IAR across different groups of stocks and looking at its relation with some stock market anomalies such as the size effect and the value effect allow us 16 to explore the possible role of private information in explaining for these anomalies. 1983-2001. Trades are signed using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. w, wsize(in thousands), wvalue (in millions) measure the value-weighted absolute order imbalance in number of transactions, shares, and dollars, respectively. wliq, wsizeliq (in thousands) and wvalueliq (in millions) measure the value-weighted order imbalance respectively (comparable to Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 2002) . wvol (in 10 millions) is value-weighted trading volume. vol (in billions) is total trading volume measured in billions. PIAR, wgood and wbad are the value-weighted posterior probability of news event occurs, good news comes and bad news comes respectively for each firm, where posterior probabilities are measured based on adapted model and estimation methodology of Easley, Kiefer and O'hara (1996) . Let P w +(1-P w )P si =α i
Figure 1
This graph describes the trading process for firm i, P w is the probability of marketwide information event occurrence, P si is the probability of firm-specific information event occurrence, δ is the probability of a bad news coming, L i is the probability the firm-specific news is bigger than marketwide news.
Information Event Occurs α i
Figure 1 (Cont.) α i (≡P w +(1-P w )P si )is the probability of an information event coming, δ is the probability of a bad news coming, µ is the rate of informed trade arrival, ε b is the uninformed buy trade arrival rate and ε s is the uninformed sell order arrival. This part of the trading process is same as Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002) . 
